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ABSTRACT
The main objective of this study is to determine the attitudes of school principals
regarding a performance based compensation system. This study identifies the attitudes
towards specific factors that should be considered in the implementation of a system of
performance based compensation. The data have been analyzed to determine if a
principal’s demographic characteristics affect his/her level of agreement with
performance based compensation and the factors for implementation. In addition, this
study unveils areas of concern that principals have conveyed regarding the
implementation of a performance based compensation system.
Data was obtained from 444 public school principals representing 444 schools
and 178 districts in the state of Colorado. Measures used in the treatment of the data
include descriptive statistics and one-way ANOVA. The major findings of this study
were:
1. 82.4% of respondents believe that teachers, principals and administrators
should be included in performance based compensation (PBC).
2. The top two indicators that respondents believed should be included in a PBC
system are student achievement (88.5%) and teacher evaluations (77.6%)
3. The 3 largest obstacles to PBC that respondents identified are:
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a. The capacity to link student achievement to teacher evaluations
(82.9%)
b. Teacher Union Resistance (67.1%)
c. Cost (55.9%)
4. Principals in urban, rural and suburban geographic groups disagree about the
effects of performance based compensation.
5. The top 5 overall concerns regarding Performance Based Compensation were:
a. Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure
performance of all teachers/equity between teachers
b. Concerns regarding evaluation (time for principals to learn,
consistency from school to school, time for principals to evaluate,
quality of evaluation tool).
c. Not in favor of PBC due to philosophical views or concerns about lack
of research.
d. Concerns regarding the equity between classrooms and districts across
the state due to poverty levels and unequal resources.
e. Concerns that performance based compensation will result in a decline
in teacher collaboration and an increase in competition between
teachers.
Based upon these findings, the researcher concluded that there is not a strong general
acceptance of performance based compensation systems. However, urban principals in
Colorado tend to view PBC somewhat more favorably than do principals in suburban or
iii

rural areas. Most importantly, systems to link student achievement to teacher evaluation
must be collaboratively created to ensure PBC systems are equitable, consistent and fair.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Critics of public education claim today that public education system is broken;
that schools and teachers are failing. Public school is being examined and calls for
reform are at an all time high. The reforms called for are grounded in past educational
theory, business theory and assumptions of “the problem”. Research tells us that the
number one factor in student achievement is an effective teacher; therefore we must not
have enough effective teachers if the system is failing. Systems that reward teachers
based on performance are not new. However, current reform initiatives suggest that these
performance based compensation structures should be revised and used as a way of
holding teachers accountable for the academic results of their students. The premise of
performance based compensation originally came from the business world, but if it is
going to be used effectively in public education it is important to understand the attitudes
that teachers, principals and administrators have regarding such systems of pay.
Although the United States Constitution provides each state with authority to
control their own educational systems, beginning in 1958 national policy makers and
politicians have used their authority to create policies during times of perceived
educational crisis. These perceived times of crisis have been presented through reports
such as the National Defense Education Act, the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Act,
the 1992 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act and A Nation at Risk. The United
States current administration is no different. Most recently the American Recovery and
1

Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provided funding that was targeted to improve state
and local education systems through the Race to the Top grant. According to Michael
Shear and Nick Anderson with the Washington Post, President Barrack Obama has used
the $4 million provided by ARRA to strong arm the education establishment to accept
more charter schools and performance pay for teachers. Knowing that student success is
dependent on an effective teacher (Jamil, Anwar, & Sultana, 2012) , the current
administration believes that effective teachers should be rewarded and ineffective
teachers should either be mentored so that they improve or guided out of the profession.
President Obama and Education Secretary Arne Duncan have made it clear that the Race
to the Top money will be distributed to the states that, among other criteria, demonstrate
a system for tying student achievement to teacher performance (Shear & Anderson,
2009).
According to the U.S. Department of Education, the Race to the Top Fund is a
competitive grant program designed to encourage and reward states that are creating the
conditions for education innovation and reform; achieving significant improvement in
student outcomes, including making substantial gains in student achievement, closing
achievement gaps, improving high school graduation rates, and ensuring student
preparation for success in college and careers; and implementing ambitious plans in four
core education reform areas (Learning Point Associates, 2010).
The Race to the Top emphasis in the core area of recruiting, developing,
rewarding, and retaining effective teachers and principals has already begun to influence
state and local policies related to teacher evaluation, teacher compensation and
performance pay systems. Although the Race to the Top Grant applications from state
2

education departments showed a wide variety of readiness in regards to implementing an
evaluation system for teachers based on teacher effectiveness and performance, all 41
grant applications shared a timeline that would lead their state to new systems of
evaluation. Many state education agencies are currently revising their policies regarding
teacher qualification and effectiveness. In fact, many states are defining teacher
effectiveness and creating new systems for teacher evaluation that are drastically
different than the evaluation systems of the past. These evaluation systems focus on the
use of student achievement data as a strong measure of teacher success. For example, in
the state of Colorado the Educator Effectiveness Council, organized by Governor Bill
Ritter, made the recommendation that fifty percent of a teacher’s evaluation should be
determined by student growth measures (The State Council for Educator Effectiveness,
2011).
In addition to an emphasis on new teacher and principal evaluation systems, the
Race to the Top grant also encourages states to compensate teachers and principals in
new ways related to their effectiveness (Smarick, 2010). Coupled with teacher evaluation
systems, performance based compensation is one of the most talked about and
controversial topics in education today. There is growing parent and community support
for a system of pay that recognizes teachers for working with students that show
academic achievement and growth. In the state of Colorado, the creation of a
performance based evaluation system will be finalized and implemented statewide for
principals as well as teachers by the school year 2014-2015. This new evaluation system
will provide the consistent data that school districts need to create new, or revise current,
performance based compensation systems for both principals and teachers.
3

Teacher Salaries
Currently, most teachers in the U.S. are compensated by means of a single salary
schedule. In this system, a teacher’s salary is determined by their years of experience and
education or academic training. Unfortunately, these factors have not been shown to
make a significant difference in student success (Hanushek, 2007; Jerald, 2010; Rice,
2010). It is this argument that prompted the early performance pay systems in the 1980s
and 1990s that offered additional incentives to teachers. Performance pay systems were
considered stand-alone systems. In addition to the single salary schedule, teachers were
able to earn extra pay for their participation in a variety of options including acquiring
new competencies in curriculum, improving instructional skills, group action research
projects, outstanding portfolios and completed professional development classes.
Principal Salaries
Principal salaries are typically determined based on a step and grade system
similar to the teacher single salary schedule. The step and grade system allows principals
who receive a satisfactory grade to receive annual salary raises. One significant
difference between the teacher salary schedule and the principal salary schedule is that
principals who work at different levels in an educational system-elementary, middle or
high school- are typically paid differently. Performance pay for principals does exist
although it is generally for extra duties performed, for additional knowledge training or
for achieving school improvement goals (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010).
Performance Pay
The research on performance and merit pay systems in education is inconclusive.
According to Eric Hanushek (2007), “merit pay” has not worked and cannot work.
4

Merit pay plans involve very small amounts of money and are evaluated based on their
ability to get more effort out of existing teachers. Current researchers agree that in order
for performance pay to work in the future it must be connected to the salary structure,
must offer substantial monetary incentives and must be evaluated with data to determine
its effectiveness (Jerald, 2010). Colorado school districts seem to be moving in just this
direction. The political climate in Colorado is supportive of holding both teachers and
principals accountable for the academic achievement and growth of their students.
Colorado Senate Bill 10-191, also referred to as the Educator Effectiveness Bill, will
require every school district in the state of Colorado to plan, develop, implement and
assess a system to evaluate the effectiveness of all licensed employees including teachers
and principals.
The General Assembly of the State of Colorado requires that at least fifty percent
of a teacher’s evaluation be determined by student achievement data and fifty percent of
the principal evaluation be determined by the academic growth of the students enrolled in
the principal’s school. In addition, the teacher and the principal will be evaluated against
new quality standards. This new evaluation system will make it easier for school districts
in Colorado to design systems of compensation that financially compensate teachers and
principals based on data from the performance of their students and schools. With
teacher and principal salaries on the line, the success of implementing a new teacher and
principal evaluation system is very high stakes.
Conceptual Framework
Policy makers, politicians, state and local education agencies and school district
officials spend a lot of time creating education policy. But according to Davis, Ellett, &
5

Annunziata (2002), most teacher evaluation policies and practices have done little to
improve teaching, learning and schools. The success of education policy depends on
whether or not the policy is grounded in strategies that are proven to make a difference in
student achievement and the successful implementation of that policy. When it comes to
the implementation of teacher evaluation policies, the responsibility falls to the local
implementer, the school principal. The school principal is held accountable for
interpreting the new teacher evaluation tool, translating it into action and leading the
teachers toward success. The active support of the principal for the evaluation policy is
necessary since the principal influences his/her teachers’ attitudes toward the policy
(Tuytens & Devos, 2010). Principals are critical to every aspect of a school. They can
influence a school and community through the decisions that they make. Principals are
initiators, innovators, motivators, calculators and communicators. Principals are
indispensable when it comes to the effective implementation of educational policy (Hope,
2002a).
Empirical research on policy implementation indicates that it is incredibly
difficult to implement a policy when there are layers of government and institutions
involved (McLaughlin, 1987). The success of policy implementation depends on
capacity and will. Capacity can be accomplished through training. For example,
principals can receive training on new evaluation standards. The principal’s will, or their
underlying attitudes, motivations and beliefs are less amenable to policy intervention
(McLaughlin, 1987). With a high stakes policy such as teacher evaluation that will lead
to adjusting teacher and principal salaries, successful implementation is critical (Hope,
2002b).
6

Statement of the Problem
Although teacher performance based compensation has been tried in various
forms for years, implementing such a data driven system for teachers and principals is
relatively new for most school districts. Principals have been recognized for decades as
important contributors to the effectiveness of schools. In fact, there is clear evidence that
principals can substantially impact the quality of teaching and learning in their schools
(Camburn, Huff, Goldring, & May, 2010). In a system where a school principal is the
local implementer for education policy, it seems critical to determine the principals’
attitudes related to performance-based compensation systems, both for themselves as well
as the teachers in their schools. By understanding the principals’ attitudes and concerns
related to performance-based compensation, school districts can work to create plans that
minimize those concerns.
While much research has been conducted regarding teachers attitudes related to
performance pay, very little research has been conducted to determine principal’s
attitudes (Goldhaber, 2007). Although there have been studies that have captured
administrators attitudes, such as the study conducted by the American Association of
School Administrators entitled Exploring the Possibility and Potential for Pay for
Performance in America’s Public Schools (Ellerson, 2009), principals’ attitudes have
never been separated from the attitudes of other administrators such as superintendents,
assistant superintendents and directors.
Data regarding teacher salaries including pay for performance incentives is
collected through national survey instruments (Gilpin, 2012). Unfortunately, the same
data is not collected for principals. In addition, school districts have worked
7

independently to develop performance based compensation systems for teachers and
principals. This work in isolation has resulted in a wide variety of programs and
components being offered around the nation. The state of Colorado has created a
common set of expectations and standards for principals and teachers. With the
recommendations from the Colorado Educator Effectiveness Council, licensed personnel
evaluations will be based on more consistent criteria, including student achievement and
growth data, therefore making performance based compensation systems easier to
implement and assess.
The performance based compensation systems being discussed in Colorado,
however, are much different than the performance pay systems of the past. Because the
new Colorado evaluation system requires that fifty percent of a licensed personnel
evaluation must be directly linked to student achievement and growth, these new
compensation systems are predicted to significantly alter the current single salary
schedules. For example, Denver Public Schools beginning in 2008 implemented a
performance pay system that they call Pro-Comp. If a teacher opts in to the Pro-Comp
system, approximately twenty percent of the teacher’s salary will be determined by
student and school assessment data. In addition, a teacher’s evaluation could change his
or her salary by one to three percent. Denver has also recently created the Principal
Incentive Pay system that will financially award principals for meeting a variety of
criteria including student achievement, student growth, documentation of best practices,
and submitting effective Unified Improvement Plans to the state of Colorado. By
surveying principals statewide regarding their attitudes of performance based
compensation systems in Colorado, school districts and school boards across the state
8

would be able to use data to inform the creation, implementation, revision and assessment
of such systems for both teachers and principals. Just as stakeholder input is critical to
the development of the new Colorado evaluation system (The State Council for Educator
Effectiveness, 2011), in order to achieve maximum success, stakeholder input from the
individuals responsible for implementing the system should be gathered regarding the
development and implementation of performance based compensation systems as well.
Objectives of Study
The main objective of this study is to determine the attitudes of school principals
regarding a performance based compensation system for teachers and principals. This
study will also attempt to identify principals’ attitudes towards specific factors that
should be considered in the implementation and administration of a system of
performance based compensation. The data will be analyzed to determine if a principal’s
demographic characteristics affect his/her level of agreement with performance-based
compensation and the factors for implementation. Finally, this study hopes to unveil any
areas of concern that principals may have, related to the implementation of a performance
based compensation system.
Research Questions
In an effort to understand school principals’ attitudes toward performance based
compensation, the following research questions were investigated:
1. What are principals’ attitudes towards identified factors in the
implementation of a performance based compensation system for teachers
and principals?
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2. Is there a correlation between a principal’s demographic characteristics
and his/her level of agreement with performance-based compensation and
the factors for implementation?
3. What are the areas of concern that principals have regarding the
implementation of a performance based compensation system?

10

Chapter Two: Literature Review
The History of Teacher Compensation
Single salary schedules.
Over the past 200 years the salary structures for educators have only experienced
three significant changes. In the 1800s, teachers received room and board in exchange
for their teaching services. The second shift in teacher salaries began in the 1900s. At
that time teachers were paid according to the position that they occupied. Elementary
teachers were paid less than secondary teachers due to the increased education
requirements for secondary teachers (Protsik, 1996). Also during this time, teacher pay
was the victim of bias as females and minorities were paid less than white males. In the
20th century, the single salary structure was created. The introduction of the single salary
schedule in the 1950s was the third major salary revision for teachers. The single salary
schedule calculated years of experience, education units and advanced degrees into the
formula for determining teacher salaries.
Public K-12 schools most commonly use the single salary schedule. Charter and
private schools frequently often offer contracts to teachers that do not follow a schedule.
Higher education institutions, unlike the public school system, often have collective
bargaining agreements that allow for differences in salaries depending on the field of
expertise and external labor market conditions (Rhoades, 1998). It is common for higher
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education to adjust salaries of the most senior faculty members that they want to keep
from transferring to other institutions.
The single salary schedule is unique to education. In no other profession is an
employee given the same rate of pay for any position in the field and for whether or not
they are productive in that position. For example, in the field of medicine, doctors are
offered different rates of pay depending on their area of specialty and their level of
success. A doctor with proven success is paid more in a hospital than one who does not
have the same rate of success (M. Podgursky & Springer, 2011). The same is true in the
world of business; employees are often paid salaries commensurate with their
productivity.
Although the single salary schedule has been around since the 1950s, researchers
have identified many problems with it. The single salary schedule was created with the
teacher in mind, not the student. This salary schedule pays the teacher who has students
that show outstanding academic successes the same as the teacher who repeatedly moves
along students who are failing. Raising teacher salaries provides incentives for both good
and bad teachers. In addition, the rigidity of the single salary schedule has been found to
influence teacher shortages, unequal distribution of quality teachers and a lack of
incentive for effective teachers to stay on the job. According to Michael Podursky and
Mathew Springer (2011), if a compensation scheme could induce highly effective
teachers to stay and ineffective teachers to leave, workforce quality and student
achievement would improve.

12

Career ladder pay.
According to Mid-continent Research for Education and Learning (2002), there
are three different types of career ladder programs: performance based, job enlargement
and professional development. As teachers demonstrate different levels of competencies
they can earn more pay in the career ladder program. For example, moving from a
novice or probationary teacher to a regular status or professional teacher and then onto a
master teacher can offer different rates of pay. When teachers assume additional
responsibilities such as mentoring new teachers, working on district committees or
supervising other employees, they are eligible for job enlargement pay increases. Finally,
as teachers gain more knowledge by taking additional classes, obtaining advanced
degrees or achieving National Board Certification, many districts recognize these
achievements with professional development pay (Reichardt, Mid-continent Research for
Education and Learning (Organization), & National Center for Education Statistics,
2002).
Although the intended purpose of career ladders is to offer all teachers the
opportunity for growth, the critics of career ladders argue that in reality, career ladders
promote competition instead of collegiality. They promote excellent teachers out of the
classroom where they no longer are able to directly affect student achievement. In
addition, career ladders are expensive to maintain and thus in tough budget times are one
of the first things to be eliminated or reduced (Lieberman, 2002).

13

Performance pay.
Types of performance pay.
After the release of A Nation at Risk report in 1983, school districts across the
United States began considering performance pay systems as an alternative or
supplement to the single salary schedule. In addition to the single salary schedule,
teachers were able to earn extra pay for their participation in a variety of options
including acquiring new competencies in curriculum, improving instructional skills,
group action research projects, outstanding portfolios and completed professional
development classes. Some examples of performance pay include: knowledge and skills
pay, group incentive rewards, outstanding or master teacher designations, individual or
group awards for school growth, individual or group awards for school achievement, and
individual or group awards for working in a high needs school (Chamberlin, Wragg,
Haynes, & Wragg, 2002).
Knowledge and skills pay, similar to the professional development career ladder,
is one way to differentiate pay for teachers. As the trend in education moved to increased
accountability and standards, the knowledge and skills pay system was put in place to
compensate teachers for acquiring specific knowledge and skills required to meet higher
expectations of performance (Reichardt et al., 2002). This approach provides teachers
stipends for completing selected classes and/or an increase in base salary for acquiring
and demonstrating skills that are necessary for improving student achievement. Through
formal and informal observations, school principals use a standards based teacher
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evaluation to assess a teacher’s performance against a standard set of skills that define a
competency model of effective teaching (H. G. Heneman III, Milanowski, Kimball, &
Odden, 2006a).
Some research has unveiled positive results when a standards based evaluation
system is coupled with knowledge and skills pay (H. G. Heneman III, Milanowski, &
Kimball, 2007). One study suggests that the scores from standards-based performance
evaluation systems can have a substantial positive relationship with student achievement
and that the instructional practices measured by these practices contribute to student
learning. Results like these encourage researchers that a system of knowledge and skills
pay used with a rigorous standards-based evaluation could be potentially useful (H. G.
Heneman III, Milanowski, Kimball, & Odden, 2006b). However, all educational
professionals do not like the knowledge and skills pay system. Administrators report that
to provide evidence to support a teacher’s acquisition of skills creates an increased
workload for them. For some teachers, familiarity and comfort with the single salary
schedule, aversion to performance pay, fears of pay fluctuations and uncertainty,
skepticism about the stability and survival of funding for the pay program, and lack of
self-confidence and assistance for meeting high performance standards all combine to
make a knowledge and skills pay program a less than welcome addition to their
educational lives (H. G. Heneman III, Milanowski, Kimball, & Odden, 2006b).
Group incentive awards are available in some districts to teachers who
collaboratively design action research projects. Groups of teachers who set and meet
performance goals are eligible for a one-time bonus. Typically, a district board reviews
15

the end of year report submitted by each teacher group and determines the amount of
award to be given. Financial awards are typically divided from a finite budget between
the numbers of participating teachers (Reichardt et al., 2002).
In some school districts, teachers who are considered master teachers or
outstanding teachers are eligible for financial awards. Those teachers earning the
National Board Certification are awarded a yearly bonus in this system. Other teachers,
who meet certain criteria through the submission of teaching portfolios, could be also
eligible for a yearly bonus.
Motivation Theory.
If teachers are more motivated, they will improve their instructional practice and,
in turn, student achievement will improve. At least that was one theory for implementing
performance pay. Therefore, much of the research that has evaluated performance pay
systems have looked most closely at motivation theory. Researchers have wanted to
know if performance pay incentives motivate teachers to improve instruction and
ultimately improve student achievement. The results of this research are mixed. Carolyn
Kelley (1999) reports that if the performance pay system is based on clear goals and
collaboration, it can motivate some individuals directly and can also create intrinsic
rewards that are likely to enhance teaching practice, opportunities for professional
development and collaboration around curriculum and instruction (Kelley, 1999).
However, in the same study, only one out of five teachers indicated that money was an
important motivator for them. This is not surprising considering the old adage that
claims teachers don’t go into the profession for the money.
16

In a Gallup poll conducted in 2010, 72 percent of public school parents and 71
percent of adults nationwide believe that each teacher should be paid based on the quality
of his/her teaching as opposed to the standard pay scale (Prince, Koppich, Azar, Bhatt, &
Witham, 2010). The difficulty has been in defining what makes an effective teacher and
showing that an effective teacher can be directly linked to student achievement data.
Performance pay plans of the 1980s and 1990s focused on identifying and rewarding
teacher behaviors that were thought to lead to student achievement. By looking at
identified characteristics of good teachers, a common measurement for the basis of
performance pay seemed possible. In the 21st century, the emphasis in performance pay
is moving from providing awards for good teaching to providing awards for student
learning. Although policy makers have strived for years to connect performance awards
to student achievement, it is not until recently that consistent assessment measures are
starting to become available. Most district and state information systems have been
simply insufficient to manage the data necessary to administer a teacher pay-forperformance program that is grounded in student data. According to research gathered by
the Data Quality Campaign, a national organization supporting states in their efforts to
use high-quality data to improve student achievement, data systems in only 11 states meet
all 10 of what they define as essential elements of a data system for school districts. The
data obtained from district and state information systems also are often riddled with
inaccuracies and errors that can wreak havoc on the operation of a performance pay
program. These types of errors have the potential to completely undermine even the
most well-designed pay-for-performance program (Burns & Gardner, 2010).
17

Teacher attitudes regarding performance pay.
Teacher attitudes towards performance based compensation is varied. Numerous
studies have been conducted since the early 90s and have produced mixed results. When
asked the right way, most teachers will agree that hard working educators should be
financially rewarded (Prince et al., 2010). Dan Goldhaber (2010) argues that the polls
conducted do not take individual and workplace characteristics into account. A teacher
working at an inner city, hard to staff school, with no performance pay available to him
may have a very different attitude on the subject than a suburban elementary school
teacher who receives several performance pay opportunities. However, findings
regarding teacher attitudes about performance based compensation indicate that a few
common attitudes do exist across research. First, it is common for women and teachers
with more experience to be less supportive of merit pay (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). In
addition, those teachers associated with a teacher’s union are also less supportive of
performance pay. Finally, private school teachers are typically more supportive of
performance pay (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010).
Specific reasons that teachers oppose or are less supportive of performance pay
have emerged. First, some teachers fear that the implementation of performance pay will
create an environment of competition; therefore collaboration will be less valued.
Collaboration is important to teachers as it often takes a collective effort to help a student
reach his fullest potential (Darling-Hammond & Berry, 1988).
When school districts attempt to implement performance pay instead of providing
an increase in base pay or a competitive base pay, they are strongly opposed by teachers
18

and teacher’s unions(Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). Although performance pay programs
may increase a teacher’s salary for one year, they generally do not increase a teacher’s
base salary. Researchers have found higher levels of support for performance pay in
school districts where teachers are already well paid and where performance pay is not
regarded as a substitute for an across the board pay increase (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993).
Performance pay has a long history of failed programs that may cause unions to hesitate
supporting new initiatives. One of the earlier examples of a failed performance pay
system occurred in Florida. This performance pay system was cancelled by the Florida
legislature for: consistent union opposition, a lack of communication with teachers
regarding the purpose of the program, and a failure to reward all but a small segment of
the state’s teachers (Darling-Hammond & Berry, 1988). According to Marguerita
Desander (2000), most performance pay programs have been terminated within six years
of implementation (DeSander, 2000).
The most commonly cited reason for teacher opposition to performance pay
programs is that evaluations will not be fair (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). In addition,
teachers were more likely to support performance pay if they had a high degree of
confidence in their principal but were less likely to support performance pay if they had a
greater sense of trust and respect for their fellow teachers than in their principal. This has
not changed in the past fifteen years. In a Public Agenda survey in 2003, fifty two
percent of teachers believed that a performance pay program would lead to principals
playing favorites by rewarding those teachers who are loyal to them or do not rock the
boat (Prince et al., 2010). According to a study conducted in 1993, teachers believe that
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administrators can’t evaluate teachers fairly and using student achievement to measure
student effectiveness is often objected on the grounds that achievement can be influenced
by many factors beyond instructors’ control (Ballou & Podgursky, 1993). Within the last
fifteen years, however, principals are continually moving away from the traditional
classroom observation as the method of teacher evaluation to a more holistic method that
uses a multiple data source approach including but not limited to artifacts, portfolios and
peer evaluation (DeSander, 2000).
Theoretical arguments for and against performance based compensation
Performance based compensation schemes have been implemented in the private
sector since the late 1980s. In the late 1990s schools began to review the benefits of a
pay system that would help improve their organization. According to Farrell and Morris
(Farrell & Morris, 2004), it was believed that teacher recruitment, retention and
motivation were low because good teacher performance was not sufficiently recognized.
Performance based compensation systems were put in place to increase motivation,
increase teacher retention and increase teacher recruitment.
Student achievement is attributed to many variables and is influenced by many
factors that a teacher is unable to control. These variables and factors make monitoring a
teacher’s performance very difficult. Murnane and Cohen call this argument
Performance Monitoring and explain it in an article entitled Merit Pay and the Evaluation
Problem (Murnane & Cohen, 1986), it is more difficult to monitor teacher performance
than any other profession because output is not readily measured in a reliable, valid and
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fair manner. However, since this article was published systems for student performance
data have become much more advanced.
Another argument that has been used against performance based compensation is
that of team production. It is common for students to work with more than one teacher
throughout their day and their school year. This team teaching approach makes it even
more difficult to attribute a student’s learning to the contributions of a single teacher. In
addition as Michael Podgursky and Matthew Springer explain in Teacher Performance
Pay: A Review, introducing performance-related rewards at the individual teacher level
might reduce incentives for teachers to cooperate and reduce, rather than increase, school
performance (M. J. Podgursky & Springer, 2007).
It is impossible to provide standardized testing for all aspects of learning or even
all subject areas. It is possible that if rewards are attached to specific areas of the
curriculum that teachers will begin to focus on only those areas while giving less
emphasis to secondary areas of the curriculum. For example, if state testing occurs in
reading, writing and math, does it mean that science and social studies should be any less
important? Avinash Dixit supports this theory in an article that examines incentives in
the public sector (Dixit, 2002). As Dixit explains, when only some of the performance of
a worker, or in this case a teacher, is measured there can be a misalignment between the
overall mission of the school or organization and that which is considered important
enough to measure.
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Principal Compensation
School reforms and improvements depend crucially on the implementation of
strategies at the school level. The successful implementation of these strategies depends
largely on principal leadership. It is clear that principals have a profound influence.
They play a crucial role in shaping their schools’ environments, which in turn influences
the quality of teachers in them. (Goldhaber, 2007). Given the critical role of the principal
and the importance of compensation in determining the quality of people who choose to
become a principal, it is important to know more about principal compensation and its
effects on school leadership.
Step and grade salary.
Most school districts use a step and grade system when designing principals’
salary structures. The step and grade system is similar to the teacher single salary
schedule that is used in the majority of school districts across the nation. Generally, the
step and grade system guarantees a yearly salary increase for a principal who receives a
satisfactory evaluation (Goldhaber, 2007). The difference between the principals’ step
and grade system and the teacher single salary schedule is that the grades that signify
differences in pay for principals are based on the level of the school. For example, high
school principals earn a higher salary than elementary school principals. For teachers,
the steps, or increases in salary, are gained by educational attainment. Teachers at the
same education level earn the same salary for either high school or elementary school.
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Performance pay.
Although there is a lack of research that reviews pay for performance programs for
school leaders, there is currently significant interest in this area. According to the Center
for Educator Compensation Reform (2007), the $99 million that has been appropriated by
the federal government to support districts and states in designing new compensation
strategies for teachers and students has created interest in over 34 districts. These
districts have been awarded grants under the Teacher Incentive Fund program to develop
systems to assess and provide monetary awards based on principal performance (Kimball,
Heneman, & Milanowski, 2007).
Some states and districts are creating standards-based leadership evaluations,
which will be used to evaluate school leaders and determine performance pay bonuses.
These evaluations are based on an explicit set of standards that school principals should
know and be able to do. In addition to using these evaluations to determine performance
pay, the intent is to create an evaluation system which improves school leadership
development and accountability (Kimball et al., 2007). Even though attaching
performance pay to school leaders is gaining in popularity, we know shockingly little
about whether giving principals performance incentives does in fact affect school
performance. In fact, basic information regarding the pay structures of principals is
missing from research (Goldhaber, 2007).
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Teacher Effectiveness and Evaluation
Teacher preparation and evaluation in the USA from 1910-1950.
By 1918, every state in the nation had passed compulsory attendance laws for
students. Although there was a decrease in schools across the nation due to the Great
Depression, once World War II was over, schools showed a surge of enrollment. At the
beginning of this time period, teachers were chosen and evaluated based on a moralistic
and ethical perspective (Ellett & Teddlie, 2003). However, that began to change with the
formation of voluntary associations working to improve teacher education and
certification. The National Education Association was officially formed in 1925 and
several organizations including: The American Association of Colleges of Teacher
Education and The National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education were formed
soon after. These organizations and councils were responsible for two major studies that
investigated the qualifications and standards for teachers in public schools (LaBue,
1960). The first of the two studies was called the National Survey.
The change in how states issued teacher certificates was an indication of the
increasing expectations of teacher qualifications and the influence of the National Survey.
By 1937, these national studies would influence the hiring qualifications of future
teachers. No longer would teachers be hired simply for being outstanding members of the
community who were viewed as possessing high moral and ethical standards. In turn,
teacher evaluations would no longer be conducted with a simple moral and ethic lens. In
the early 1940s philosophies and frameworks regarding teacher evaluation such as the
Ohio Reaching Record began appearing in literature (Ellett & Teddlie, 2003).
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Teacher preparation and evaluation in the USA from 1950-1980.
In the 1950s and 1960s educational researchers began to focus their attention to
teacher behaviors that resulted in student outcomes. Although the certification
requirements across the states continued to be greatly diverse, evaluations began to
reflect the teaching methods used in the classrooms. During this era, teacher evaluators
would often use checklists that included teacher behaviors that, according to research at
the time, were more apt to produce positive student outcomes (e.g., OSCAR, CASES,
STARS, FLANDERS, PORS) (Ellett & Teddlie, 2003). In addition, educational
literature placed a large emphasis on classroom observations and evaluations.
Throughout the 1970s classroom-based studies continued to produce theories
regarding effective teaching practices and student outcomes. According to Ellet (2003),
the predominant paradigm for research on teaching became known as process-product
research, and elements of teaching documented as important in the literature began to
frame criteria appearing on many teacher evaluation systems.
Educational policy and reform movements.
Although the United States Constitution provides each state the authority to make
decisions regarding teacher education, licensing and school curricula, national level
policy makers beginning in 1958 have used their authority to create policies during times
of perceived educational crisis. These perceived times of crisis as presented through
reports such as the National Defense Education Act (NDEA, date), the 1965 Elementary
and Secondary Act (ESEA) and the 1992 reauthorization of the Higher Education Act
(HEA) and A Nation at Risk: The imperative for education reform created the urgency
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necessary to force states to abide by specific education reforms including those related to
teacher education, certification and licensing.
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 is the most significant component of
educational reform in the past fifty years. This act calls for all students to achieve
proficiency or higher in the areas of reading and mathematics by the school year 20132014. Despite all of the professional development and policy changes, many gaps in
achievement are still evident. In 2011, states across the nation are continuing to reevaluate state standards, enact increased legislation regarding teacher evaluation and
prohibit collective bargaining. Individual school districts are evaluating their
compensation structures and increasing teacher accountability for student performance.
Teacher effectiveness.
The perception of a good teacher has evolved from the concept of teacher quality
to the concept of teacher effectiveness. Student achievement is the difference between
these two terms. A teacher can possess the characteristics of a quality teacher, yet if the
teacher’s students do not achieve academically then the teacher is not deemed effective.
Thus, teacher quality and teacher effectiveness are very different. According to Laura
Goe, teacher qualifications, characteristics, and practices are all used to define teacher
quality and exist independently of student achievement, whereas teacher effectiveness is
wholly dependent on student achievement (Goe & National Comprehensive Center for
Teacher Quality (US), 2007). The paradigm of teacher evaluation has shifted from a
teacher-centered focus to a learner-centered focus.
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The theory that student achievement is most affected by an effective teacher still
exists, however research connecting the characteristics and practices of quality teachers
to student achievement, is limited. Researchers use a variety of definitions for a quality
or effective teacher and research is more likely to be found on effective teaching versus
the effective teacher. New legislation being passed will evaluate and compensate
teachers, at least in part, for their students’ academic achievement. They will be asked to
be more than quality teachers, they will be asked to be effective teachers. In the state of
Colorado, the Educator Effectiveness Council crafted the following definition of an
effective teacher.
Effective teachers in the state of Colorado have the knowledge, skills and
commitments that ensure equitable learning opportunities and growth for all
students. They strive to close achievement gaps and to prepare diverse student
populations for postsecondary success. Effective teachers facilitate mastery of
content and skill development, and identify and employ appropriate strategies for
students who are not achieving mastery. They also develop in students the skills,
interests and abilities necessary to be lifelong learners, as well as for democratic
and civic participation. Effective teachers communicate high expectations to
students and their families and find ways to engage them in a mutually supportive
teaching and learning environment. Because effective teachers understand that the
work of ensuring meaningful learning opportunities for all students cannot happen
in isolation, they engage in continuous reflection, on-going learning and
leadership within the profession (The State Council for Educator Effectiveness,
2011).

This definition follows Laura Goe’s theory of teacher effectiveness by including teacher
qualifications, characteristics and practices as well as an expectation for student
achievement. This definition will assist policy makers and school district administrators
in the state of Colorado to establish indicators of teacher effectiveness that can be used
within the teacher evaluation process.
27

Principal Effectiveness
Principals are important contributors to the effectiveness of schools. During a
time of accountability reform and shared decision making in schools, good leadership
matters. Existing effective schools research tells us that effective principals influence a
variety of school outcomes, including student achievement, through their recruitment and
motivation of highly qualified teachers, their ability to identify and articulate school
vision and goals, their effective allocation of resources and their development of
organizational structures to support instruction and learning (Rice, 2010). Principals are
also responsible for teacher evaluation. Even if the quality of the evaluation instrument
being used is outstanding, if the principal does not support it, it has little meaning.
Although the importance of the principal for the implementation of educational policy on
teacher evaluation is widely recognized, research on the role of the principal when
implementing and conducting teacher evaluation is limited (Rice, 2010).
Being able to create an environment of trust and efficacy for students, teachers
and parents is a critical role of the principal and one, which makes a difference in student
achievement. This critical environment helps to recruit and retain highly qualified
teachers. Survey and case-study research suggests that teachers greatly value competent,
supportive, innovative and fair principals who place the well-being of students at the
forefront of a school’s agenda (Goldhaber, 2007). In fact, an in-depth study of Chicago
schools revealed that the level of effective social relationships, called relational trust, in
schools is far more important than curricular or pedagogical reforms for improving
student achievement (Slotnik, 2010).
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Summary
Although performance based compensation is not a new term, the current interest
which links a teacher or principal’s performance more directly to student achievement is
gaining much attention. Research regarding the effectiveness of performance based
compensation programs shows mixed results and has been difficult to gather due to the
great number of variables present. Regardless of whether or not the research supports
that performance based compensation systems are effective, the current political climate
continues to push the initiative forward.
Many studies emphasize the need for stakeholder input in order for a
compensation system to be effective. Teachers’ attitudes have been gathered by various
research studies and continue to be monitored by teacher unions. However, school
principals, who are often the sole person responsible for recruiting and retaining high
quality teachers and for evaluating those teachers, have not had much of a chance to
voice their opinions and concerns regarding performance based compensation systems.
By filling this gap in the research, compensation systems will have a greater chance of
being successfully implemented.
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Chapter Three: Methodology
Purpose of the Study
This study is concerned with identifying the attitudes of school principals in the
state of Colorado toward performance based compensation systems that either
significantly alter or replace traditional compensation systems for both teachers and
principals. Although some school districts have implemented components of
performance pay, the degree to which traditional compensation systems are predicted to
be changed is substantial. Currently, little research is available regarding school
principals’ attitudes of these types of performance based compensation systems. This
study is an attempt to gain data relative to the state of Colorado that can be used by state
legislators and administrators, local boards of education, district administrators, teacher
organizations and others who may be interested in the attitudes of principals related to
performance based compensation systems when developing or revising such a system.
Study Sample
All principals in the state of Colorado who are currently employed at public
elementary, middle and high schools were contacted to participate in this attitude survey.
The total sample represented principals from approximately 178 school districts across
the state of Colorado. Because they are not subject to the same rules, regulations and
statutes as public schools, charters, private, vocational and online school principals were
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omitted from this study. Email addresses were obtained from school district websites
linked from a directory located at the Colorado Department of Education website. This
sample included rural, suburban and urban school district principals who work in schools
that have students from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds.
Development of the Survey Instrument
A review of literature revealed that several survey instruments exist that have
been used to measure teacher attitudes related to compensation or pay for performance.
However, an instrument specifically designed for school principals could not be located.
Therefore, the researcher modified questions from the following surveys to be used with
Colorado school principals:
1. A survey designed by the American Association of School Administrators
in a study entitled Exploring the Possibility and Potential for Pay for
Performance in America’s Public Schools (Ellerson, 2009).
2. A survey used to collect data regarding teacher attitudes related to
performance pay in a dissertation written by David Anthony Sautte’
(Sautte, 1987).
3. A survey designed by Catherine Farrell and Jonathan Morris in a study
entitled Resigned Compliance: Teacher Attitudes towards PerformanceRelated Pay in Schools (Farrell & Morris, 2004).
4. A survey conducted by the National Center on Performance Incentives at
Vanderbilt University for schools participating in the Teacher Incentive
Fund program (Heyburn, Lewis, & Ritter, 2010).
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The survey began with general demographic information that has been used to compare
respondent’s attitudes based on their individual demographic characteristics. These
demographic categories included: gender, age, years experience, highest level of
education, school AYP status and school location category (urban, rural or suburban).
The following three questions from the American Association of School
Administrators (AASA) study were identically replicated:
1. If your district were to implement a pay for performance plan, please indicate the
levels where you think performance pay should be included in evaluations.
2. Of the system and individual indicators listed below, please mark those you
would consider in a pay for performance model:
3. What obstacles do you expect/have you experiences in implementing a pay for
performance program?
Specifically, question one was included to help identify the principal attitudes
related to the various educator groups that the principals felt should be included if a
performance based compensation system were to be implemented. Question two was
included in this study to determine the principals’ attitudes toward factors that have been
previously identified by AASA that could be included in a system of performance based
compensation. Although the study conducted by AASA was designed for administrators,
the majority of the respondents were superintendents and assistant superintendents. By
replicated these three questions in this research, comparisons can be made between the
attitudes of administrators versus those of principals.
Questions 13-23 were taken from a survey conducted by David Anthony Sautte
(Sautte, 1987). These questions were chosen from a list of 16 questions because of their
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focus on possible implementation concerns. The final survey was created using the
Survey Monkey online surveying tool.
To increase the validity of the survey instrument used, an expert review of the
survey was conducted with seven experts in the field of education and compensation
reform. Each expert was given a draft of the survey instrument with an additional
questionnaire to complete regarding the survey instrument. Each expert was asked 1)
how long it took them to complete the survey; 2) did the survey measure principal
attitudes toward performance based compensation? (validity); 3) did the survey gather
principal concerns toward performance based compensation? (validity); 4) if the survey
were given to respondents a second time, would their responses be essentially the same?
(reliability); 5) to list any other suggested questions; 6) to list any suggestions they might
have to improve the survey.
Once the expert review of the survey was completed, the researcher reviewed the
feedback from the experts and revised the survey instrument. Based on the feedback
from the expert review, the questions on the survey were not changed. However, the
formatting of the survey was improved to allow the respondent more text space to enter
their answers to the open-ended questions. All participants in the expert review reported
that the survey took between 11-16 minutes for them to complete. Therefore, the length
of the survey remained the same in the final version.
Collection of the Data
After creating the survey using Survey Monkey, a link was created that was
attached to an email for distribution to the requested participants of the study. An email
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was sent to each requested participant outlining the purpose of the study and the link
where they may access the survey. The survey remained open for 30 days and a reminder
email was sent to requested participants at the beginning of each week. Once the survey
was closed, the data were collected and sorted using the Survey Monkey tool.
Data Analysis Measures
The following descriptive statistics were used for measures of central tendency:
1. Frequencies
2. Means
3. Percentages
4. Standard deviations

One-Way ANOVAs were used to determine analysis of variance and significant
differences between demographic groups.
Protection of Human Subjects
Confidentiality of principal data is of the utmost concern for the researcher.
Surveys were submitted electronically to Survey Monkey to ensure confidentiality.
Respondents were not asked to reveal their identity on the survey.
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Chapter Four: Presentation and Analysis of Data
This chapter is a presentation and analysis of the data that were collected in a
manner consistent with the methodology described in Chapter Three. This study
investigated school principal attitudes in the state of Colorado toward performance based
compensation systems for both teachers and principals. Inferential statistics were used to
identify the attitudes of Colorado principals towards factors that could be considered in
the implementation of a performance based compensation system. The demographic data
that principals supplied on the survey instrument were tested against their attitudes to
determine if correlational patterns or relationships existed between principal attitudes and
certain demographic variables. In addition, the principals provided open-ended responses
regarding their concerns related to performance based compensation. These responses
were coded and analyzed to identify patterns and trends.
The participants in this study completed a 21-item online survey designed by the
researcher. Questions included in the study were chosen and modified from previous
research studies as outlined in the Development of the Survey Instrument section of
Chapter Three. Participants were asked to respond to six demographic questions and
fourteen statements about the factors of performance based compensation. Additionally,
one open-ended question was included to identify concerns related to performance based
compensation that may or may not have been included in the other questions.
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Survey Respondents
As calculated from the Colorado Department of Education list of schools and
districts, there are 1225 public school principals employed across the state. Of these
1225 principals, 47% (n=578) are male and 53% (n=647) are female. Additionally, of
these 1225 Colorado principals, 355 are employed in rural locations (29%), 269
principals work in urban schools (22%) and 601 principals work in suburban schools
(49%).
The survey instrument was sent to 1,225 email addresses of principals identified
from the Colorado Department of Education list of districts, schools and leaders as well
as school district websites. Sixty-two emails were rejected due to incorrect and/or
changed email addresses. A total of 1,163 surveys were successfully sent to valid email
addresses. A total of 444 respondents completed the survey resulting in a 38.2%
response rate.
Participants of the survey were closely balanced according to gender. Of the 444
surveys returned, 54.7% were from females (n=243) and 45.3% were from males
(n=201). All respondents reported their gender.
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Table 1
Gender
________________________________________________________________________
Survey Respondents
Public School Principals in Colorado
Gender
n
%
n
%
________________________________________________________________________
Female

243

54.7%

647

53%

Male

201

45.3%

578

47%

No Response

0

0%

Total
444
100%
1225
100%
________________________________________________________________________
Participants were asked to identify their age based on eight choices: (1) under
22, (2) 22-28, (3) 29-33, (4) 34-40, (5) 41-45, (6) 46-50, (7) 51-55 or (8) over
55. All respondents indicated their age. There were no respondents that reported an age
lower than 29 years. Of those respondents older than 29 years, 9 were between the ages
of 29 and 33 (2.0%). 73 respondents reported to be between 34 and 40 years of age
(16.4%). There were 90 respondents who reported their age between 41 and 45 (20.3%).
Similarly, 92 respondents reported to be between 46 and 50 years old (20.7%).
Representing the largest age group at 21.6% were 96 respondents. Finally, 84
respondents reported to over 55 years of age (18.9%).
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Table 2
Age
________________________________________________________________________
Age
n
%
________________________________________________________________________
under 22

0

0%

22-28

0

0%

29-33

9

2.0%

34-40

73

16.4%

41-45

90

20.3%

46-50

92

20.7%

51-55

96

21.6%

over 55

84

18.9%

Total

444

100%

________________________________________________________________________
Participants were asked to indicate their number of years of principal experience
within ranges. The smallest percentage of respondents (6.5%) reported less than one year
of principal experience. The largest percentage of respondents (25.9%) reported 4-6
years of experience. Respondents with 1-3 years of principal experience comprised
17.3% of the total and those with 10-15 years of principal experience represented 18.5%
of the total number of respondents. 67 respondents reported the most principal
experience (over 15 years) and represented 15.1% of the total.
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Table 3
Total Years of Principal Experience
________________________________________________________________________
Total Years of Principal Experience
n
%
________________________________________________________________________
less than 1

29

6.5%

1-3

77

17.3%

4-6

115

25.9%

7-9

74

16.7%

10-15

82

18.5%

over 15

67

15.1%

Total
444
100.0%
________________________________________________________________________
Principals were asked to indicate the highest academic degree that they had
earned (Table 4). Only 2 respondents reported holding only a bachelor’s degree (0.5%).
The majority of respondents, 366 (82.4%), reported holding a master’s degree. An
advanced degree including EdD or PhD was held by 76 (17.1%) of the respondents.
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Table 4
Highest Level of Education
________________________________________________________________________
Highest Level of Education
n
%
________________________________________________________________________
master’s degree

366

82.4%

advanced degree

76

17.1%

bachelor’s degree

2

0.5%

Total
444
100%
________________________________________________________________________
Principals were asked to identify whether or not their schools were making
“Adequate Yearly Progress” (AYP) as defined in No Child Left Behind. Only 3 (.7%) of
the respondents did not know whether their school had made AYP. Of the remaining
respondents, the majority of respondents (53.6%) indicated that their school was making
AYP whereas 45.7% indicated the opposite. Results are displayed in Table 5.
Table 5
Annual Yearly Progress (AYP)
________________________________________________________________________
Annual Yearly Progress (AYP)
n
%
________________________________________________________________________
yes

238

53.6%

no

203

45.7%

3

0.7%

I don’t know

Total
444
100%
________________________________________________________________________
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In the state of Colorado, school districts can be categorized as rural, urban or
suburban. However, there are very large school districts that are close to urban areas but
comprise a very large geographic region. For the purpose of this study, large districts
with large geographic regions are considered suburban. In the survey, respondents were
asked to indicate if their school district was rural, urban or suburban. Results are
displayed in Table 6. 167 respondents indicated that their school resides within a rural
category. The smallest number, 90 respondents, reported that their school was in an
urban location. 184 respondents indicated their school is suburban.
Table 6
Geographic Categories
________________________________________________________________________
Survey Respondents
State of Colorado
Demographics
Geographic Categories
n
%
n
%
________________________________________________________________________
Suburban

184

41.4%

601

49%

Rural

167

37.6%

355

29%

Urban

93

20.9%

269

22%

Total
444
100%
1225
100%
________________________________________________________________________
Performance Based Compensation Factors
Participants were asked to respond to a hypothetical question that stated, “If your
district were to implement a pay for performance plan, please indicate the levels where
you think performance pay should be included in evaluations.” A total of 410
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participants responded to this question and 82.4% of them indicated that all three levels
(teacher, principal and administrator) should be included (Figure 1). 52 respondents
(12.7%) indicated that performance pay should be included in only teacher evaluations.
14 believed that performance pay should only be for principals and 6 indicated that it
should only be for administrators. 34 respondents chose not to respond to this question.
Forty respondents provided comments in this section regarding the educational
levels that should be included in a performance based compensation system. Fifteen
respondents provided comments that showed their disagreement with the implementation
of a system for performance based compensation. For example, one respondent wrote,
“Pay for performance is an ineffective change strategy.” Other comments included, “I do
not have a positive attitude toward pay for performance on any level,” “I am opposed to
pay for performance unless it is for bonuses only. I don’t believe it should be part of the
regular salary,” “Do not support pay for performance-encourages competition between
schools and teachers instead of collegiality” and “None. Chasing financial incentives
may not result in decisions that are best for students.”
Seven of the respondents indicated that their district already had a pay for
performance plan. Out of these seven comments, three indicated that their current plan
includes teachers, principals and administrators. The other four of these respondents did
not indicate which levels were currently included in their PBC systems.
Nine comments were left in this section that indicated only teachers and principals
should be included in a PBC system. This option was not provided in the structured
question on the survey. Finally, 3 comments were made that indicated classified support
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staff should also be included in a system for performance pay. Overall, 25% of these
comments seemed to have a neutral attitude towards performance based compensation,
35% were more positive towards PBC in that they indicated additional educator groups
that should be included in such a system and 40% were negative comments towards
performance based compensation.

Figure 1. Participants indicated the job groups that should be included in performance
based compensation plans.
Participants were asked to consider individual factors that should be considered in
a performance based compensation model. Out of 410 respondents to this question,
88.5% (n=363) indicated that student achievement should be considered. All question
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options were selected by at least 50 respondents. Including teacher grievances as part of
a performance based compensation model was the least favored as only 12.2% of the
respondents selected this option. In addition to the listed options provided by the
researcher, respondents were able to provide additional commentary.
Respondents left a total of 48 comments for this question on the survey. Other
factors that were suggested by the respondents included: student growth (n=23), progress
toward individual or school goals, professionalism, principal standards and high needs
population considerations. The following comments are representative of the comments
left in this section: “I believe that student achievement should be measured by more than
CSAP scores,” “Student achievement measured in growth,” “Achievement as measured
by the growth model,” “student growth, regardless of proficiency level”. “I have issues
with all of them. Concerned about the level of reliability,” “None of the above can be
effectively measured and linked to educator,” “none of the above…each will simply
game the system and detract from the purpose of education,” are a few of the quotes left
by the 9 respondents who expressed their disapproval with performance based
compensation systems. Complete results are listed in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Participants indicated factors that should be considered in a pay for
performance program.
Participants were asked to identify the obstacles that they have either experienced
or believe they would experience in the implementation of a pay for performance
program. According to the participants who answered the question (n=410), their three
largest identified obstacles are: the capacity to link teacher evaluation and/or student
achievement to evaluations (82.9%), teacher union resistance (67.1%) and cost (55.9%).
A total of forty respondents left comments in the section provided for this
question, respondents indicated that there is currently a lack of clean data available for all
employee groups (n=9). For example, one respondent replied, “I think there are issues
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even with student growth-really, at least at the middle school level, there are multiple
teachers who should be instructing students in reading and writing, not just the English
teacher-how do we decide how to weight this?” Additionally, some respondents (n=6)
were concerned that demographic differences between schools and districts would cause
unfair pay for performance results. Comments included, “Schools with high poverty/high
mobility/ELI population make slower growth,” “Socio-economic disparity between and
among schools,” and “Differences in academic achievement and student behavior that are
inherent with demographic differences.” Six respondents indicated that they did not
answer the question because they do not believe a pay for performance program should
be considered at all. Finally, three respondents indicated that they have concerns that a
pay for performance system would lead to competition rather than collaboration. For
example, “These systems will create an adversarial relationship within an environment
that needs collaboration and team synergy to meet the needs of students,” was one of the
comments submitted. Complete results are reported in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Participants identified the concerns that they would have in implementing a
performance based compensation system.
Principal Attitudes Regarding Performance Based Compensation
Participants were asked to respond to a series of statements regarding
performance based compensation and indicate their level of agreement or disagreement
using a 5 point likert scale that ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Results
are reported in Table 7.
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Table 7
Performance Pay Statements
________________________________________________________________________
Strong
DisUndeci Agree
Strong #
Performance Pay Statement
Disagree

agree

ded

1. Administrators should be
included in the rating of teachers
for PBC
2. My teachers trust me to give
them a fair and reasonable
evaluation
3. Self-evaluations should be
included in rating teachers and
principals for PBC

2.2%
(9)

3.4%
(14)

9.8%
(40)

50.1%
(204)

34.4%
(140)

407

.7%
(3)

1.2%
(5)

7.8%
(32)

65.3%
(267)

24.9%
(102)

409

2.5%
(10)

7.6%
(31)

11.8%
(48)

51.8%
(211)

26.3%
(107)

407

4. My school district has
implemented an evaluation
system that allows me to fairly
and accurately evaluate teachers

3.2%
(13)

14.7%
(60)

16.9%
(69)

54.4%
(222)

10.8%
(44)

408

5. My school district has
implemented an evaluation
system that allows my supervisor
to fairly and accurately evaluate
me.
6. PBC results in a lack of
collaboration among staff

4.9%
(20)

14.9%
(61)

21%
(86)

51%
(209)

8.3%
(34)

410

12.6%
(51)

29.6%
(120)

32.8%
(133)

16%
(65)

9.1%
(37)

406

7. PBC results in resentment
among teachers

5.6%
(23)

24%
(98)

29.7%
(121)

28.9%
(118)

11.8%
(48)

408

8. PBC is problematic because it
is difficult to link the work done
in schools to individual
performance

3.7%
(15)

24.6%
(100)

12.8%
(52)

39.1%
(159)

19.9%
(81)

407

9. PBC will have a positive
impact on teacher recruitment

7.9%
(32)

20.9%
(85)

33.7%
(137)

31%
(126)

6.4%
(26)

406

10. PBC will lead to better and
more effective teaching

6.9%
(28)

17.5%
(71)

31.5%
(128)

36.9%
(150)

7.1%
(29)

406

11. PBC will lead to improved
student achievement

6.4%
(26)

16.7%
(68)

32.6%
(133)

37.7%
(154)

6.6%
(27)

408
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Agree

The results reported in Table 7 show a clear difference between the questions that
deal with the results or effects of performance based compensation and those questions
that deal with the more concrete factors that may be included in performance based
compensation systems. For example, the percentage of undecided responses from
questions 1-5 and 8 range from 7.8% to 21%. These questions all have to do with the
factors or individual indicators that may be included in a PBC system. However, in the
questions 6,7,9,10 and 11, principals are asked to give their perception on the results or
effects that might occur in a PBC system. In these areas many more respondents reported
that they are undecided. For example, when asked if PBC will result in better or more
effective teaching, will result in a lack of collaboration among teachers, will lead to
improved student achievement or will have a positive impact on teacher recruitment, the
percentage of principal respondents in the undecided category ranged from 31.5% to
33.7%.
Analyzing the Relationship Between Attitudes and Demographics
ANOVAs were run by the demographic categories of: years of experience,
highest level of education, AYP status of school and school region to determine if the
responses to the survey differed by demographic characteristics. Results are considered
significant at p < .05. Although all eleven attitude items were run by the demographic
categories listed above, only the categories of AYP status and school region produced
significant differences in results.
Principals were asked to indicate whether or not the school in which they
currently work has met Annual Yearly Progress as required by No Child Left Behind.
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Although ten out of the eleven attitude questions produced no significant differences
between those principals whose schools met AYP (AYP principals) versus those
principals whose schools did not meet AYP (No AYP principals), question number 2 did
produce significant differences. Question 2 states, “My teachers trust me to give them a
fair and reasonable evaluation.” A significantly greater percentage of respondents in
schools meeting AYP agreed with the statement. The mean of the “AYP principals” was
4.22 and the mean of the “No AYP principals” was 4.02. Complete ANOVA results or
question 2 as compared to AYP status are reported in Figure 4.
Analysis of Variance results: AYP Comparison Regarding Trust
Column means
Column

n

Mean

Std. Error

Yes

215 4.2232556 0.04045055

No

193 4.0207253 0.05034346

ANOVA table
Source
Treatments

df

SS

MS

F-Stat

1 4.1717296 4.1717296 10.01013

Error

406 169.20082 0.4167508

Total

407 173.37254

P-value
0.0017

Figure 4. A significant difference of means was discovered between principals in
schools that met AYP versus principals in schools that did not meet AYP.
The largest number of significant differences of mean occurred when the principal
attitudes were divided by the principal’s school region and then compared to each other.
Principals were asked to identify whether the school in which they currently work would
be considered rural, urban or suburban. A significant difference between these three
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groups was found in statement 3 (Self-evaluations should be included in rating teachers
and principals for PBC). In questions 6, 9, 10 and 11, a one-way ANOVA test showed
significant differences between the regions. Post hoc analyses using the Scheffe post-hoc
criterion for significance indicated that there is a significant difference of means between
the urban group as compared to both the suburban and rural groups. (figure 5)

Figure 5: Scheffe post-hoc comparison shows significant difference identified between
the urban and suburban group as well as the urban and rural group.
Principals in all 3 region groups tend to have similar attitudes regarding the
evaluation system that they use with teachers and the evaluation system that their
supervisors use with them. However, differences in attitudes occur when principals
respond to the idea that self-evaluations should be included in rating teachers and
principals for performance based compensation. As shown in Figure 6, principals in
suburban areas (M=4.08) tend to more strongly agree that self evaluations should be
included in PBC systems than do principals in urban schools (M=3.71).
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Analysis of Variance results: Including Self-Evaluations By Region
Column means
Column

N

rural

Mean

158 3.8607595

urban

Std. Error
0.07429876

83 3.7108433 0.107778735

suburban 166 4.0783134 0.071998015
ANOVA table
Source
Treatments

df
2

SS
8.345447

MS

F-Stat

4.1727233 4.7091613

Error

404 357.97888 0.88608634

Total

406

P-value
0.0095

366.3243

Figure 6: Principal attitudes about including self-evaluations into PBC systems as
compared by region (rural, urban, suburban)
In the following four questions, the principal respondents in the rural and
suburban groups show no significant differences in mean (Figures 7,9,11 and 13).
However, the ANOVA results comparing all 3 groups uncover significant differences of
mean between the urban principals versus the rural and suburban principals. Principals in
the urban regions tend to disagree with the rural and suburban principals about whether or
not PBC will result in a lack of collaboration among staff. Figure 8 shows the ANOVA
results for question 6. Although many principals overall indicated that they were
undecided in regards to this question (n=133), principals in urban areas tended to disagree
more strongly than principals in either suburban or rural areas. Although a t-test is the
more traditional statistic to use with two variables, the researcher chose to use a one-way
ANOVA when comparing the rural and suburban groups throughout the study to provide
consistency in reporting results.
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Analysis of Variance results-Comparing Rural and Urban and Lack of Collaboration
Column means
Column

n

rural

Mean

Std. Error

159 2.8930817 0.08398141

suburban 164

2.871951 0.09036954

ANOVA table
Source

df

Treatments

SS

MS

F-Stat

1 0.036046218 0.036046218 0.029256713

Error

321

395.49338

Total

322

395.52942

P-value
0.8643

1.2320665

Figure 7. ANOVA results show no significant difference in mean between the rural and
suburban groups for question 6.
Analysis of Variance results-Comparing Rural, Urban and Suburban and Lack of Collaboration
Column means
Column

n

Mean

Std. Error

rural

159 2.8930817 0.08398141

urban

83 2.4578314 0.12862574

suburban 164

2.871951 0.09036954

ANOVA table
Source
Treatments

df

SS

MS

F-Stat

2 11.936245 5.9681225 4.733661

Error

403 508.09576 1.2607836

Total

405 520.03204

P-value
0.0093

Figure 8. Principal attitudes about whether or not PBC will lead to a lack of collaboration
when compared by region (rural, urban, suburban).
Another area where principals disagree depending on their region is on question
9, which states that Performance Based Compensation will have a positive impact on
teacher recruitment. ANOVA results for question 9 comparing all 3 groups are displayed
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in Figure 10. Urban and suburban principals tend to largely disagree on this statement.
Suburban principals show the strongest level of disagreement in this area (M=2.98).
Analysis of Variance results-Comparing Rural and Suburban and Teacher Recruitment
Column means
Column
rural

n

Mean

Std. Error

161 3.0248446 0.08025111

suburban 167 2.9820359 0.08255753
ANOVA table
Source

df

Treatments

SS

MS

F-Stat

P-value

1 0.15022232 0.15022232 0.13801022

Error

326

354.84674

Total

327

354.99695

0.7105

1.0884869

Figure 9. ANOVA results showing no significant differences of mean between the rural
and suburban groups for question 9- Teacher Recruitment.
Analysis of Variance results-Comparing Rural, Urban and Suburban and Teacher Recruitment
Column means
Column
rural
urban

n

Mean

Std. Error

161 3.0248446 0.08025111
81

3.382716 0.11050934

suburban 167 2.9820359 0.08255753
ANOVA table
Source
Treatments

df
2

SS
9.513802

MS

F-Stat

4.756901 4.450183

Error

406 433.98254 1.0689225

Total

408 443.49634

P-value
0.0123

Figure 10. Principal attitudes regarding whether or not PBC will have a positive impact
on teacher recruitment as reported by region.
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Overall, more principal respondents agree than disagree that performance based
compensation will lead to better and more effective teaching. There is no statistically
significant difference between the rural and suburban groups on this question (Figure 11).
However, when the urban group is compared to either the rural group or the suburban
group, a statistically significant difference appears (Figure 12). Principals in urban
schools agree to a stronger degree that performance based compensation systems will
lead to better and more effective teaching.
Analysis of Variance results-Comparing Rural and Suburban and Effective Teaching
Column means
Column
rural

n

Mean

Std. Error

158 3.1392405 0.083495915

suburban 167 3.1137724

0.08121221

ANOVA table
Source
Treatments

df

SS

MS

F-Stat

1 0.052660093 0.052660093 0.047808893

Error

323

355.77502

Total

324

355.8277

P-value
0.8271

1.1014707

Figure 11. The chart above shows that there is no statistically significant difference
between the rural and suburban groups on question 10, PBC will lead to better and more
effective teaching.
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Analysis of Variance results-Comparing Rural, Urban and Suburban and Effective Teaching
Column means
Column

n

rural

Mean

Std. Error

158 3.1392405 0.083495915

urban

81

3.493827

0.1026252

suburban 167 3.1137724

0.08121221

ANOVA table
Source
Treatments

df
2

SS
8.817956

MS

F-Stat

4.408978 4.1903915

Error

403 424.02194 1.0521636

Total

405

P-value
0.0158

432.8399

Figure 12. ANOVA results show a significant difference between the urban versus
suburban or rural groups regarding whether or not PBC will result in better and more
effective teaching.
Lastly, question 11 also produces results that show a significant difference
between the urban versus rural and suburban groups (Figure 14), but no significant
difference between the rural and suburban groups themselves (Figure 13). Urban
principal respondents tend to agree to higher level that performance based compensation
will lead to improved student achievement.
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Analysis of Variance results-Compating Rural and Suburban and Student Achievement
Column means
Column

n

rural

Mean

Std. Error

158 3.1455696 0.08318517

suburban 167 3.1616766 0.07845514
ANOVA table
Source

df

Treatments

SS

MS

F-Stat

P-value

1 0.021063035 0.021063035 0.019876208

Error

323

342.28662

Total

324

342.30768

0.888

1.059711

Figure 13. This figure shows that there is no significant difference between the rural and
suburban groups in regards to question 11.
Analysis of Variance results-Comparing Rural, Urban and Suburban and Student Achievement
Data stored in separate columns.
Column means
Column

n

Mean

Std. Error

rural

158 3.1455696 0.08318517

urban

83 3.4578314 0.09892339

suburban 167 3.1616766 0.07845514
ANOVA table
Source
Treatments

df
2

SS

MS

F-Stat

6.130569 3.0652845 3.0361297

Error

405 408.88904 1.0096025

Total

407 415.01962

P-value
0.0491

Figure 14. This figure shows that there is a significant difference of means between the
rural and suburban groups as compared to the urban group in regards to question 11.
Performance Based Compensation Concerns-Open Ended Comments
The third research question presented in this study states, “What are the areas of
concern that principals have related to the implementation of a performance based
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compensation system?” On the survey, principals were asked to list and prioritize their
top 4 concerns related to performance-based compensation. A total of 299 (67%)
participants contributed at least one concern. 254 (57%) participants listed a second
concern. 176 (40%) participants contributed a third concern and 93 (21%) participants
contributed a fourth concern. Keeping each priority list separate, the researcher read
through each of the 822 listed concerns and coded the responses identifying the common
themes for each priority. Priority one concerns resulted in 14 themes being identified
(Table 9).
Priority two concerns, shown in Table 10, were the same as priority one although
in slightly different order. For example, concerns regarding collaboration versus
competition were the third most popular concern under priority two when they were the
fifth most popular concern in priority one. In addition, an addition theme emerged in
priority two. 5 respondents listed comments in the priority two section that dealt with a
concern regarding the lack of teacher buy-in, understanding and support.
The same process was used to evaluate priority three and priority four concerns.
Each of these levels produced additional themes as well. Three additional themes
emerged in the priority three section of the survey including: (a) evaluation process for
principals, (b) principal trust, (c) worry about losing job and/or pay. Administrator buyin emerged as an additional theme in the level four priority.
Finally, the concerns from all four priorities were combined to reveal the top five
overall themes. The survey did not prevent a participant from entering the same concern
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in each of the priority boxes. However, because the response rate for each priority
gradually decreased, the researcher assumes that this would have been a rare occurrence.
The top 5 themes in priority order are listed in Table 11.
Table 9
Priority One Themes in Order of Frequency
________________________________________________________________________
Priority One Themes in Order of Frequency
1
Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure performance of all
teachers/equity between teachers
2
Concerns regarding the Evaluation. (time for principals to learn, consistency from
school to school, time for principals to evaluate, quality evaluation tool)
3
Concerns regarding clear PBC components and “weights”
4
Money/Costs related to PBC
5
Collaboration v. Competition
6
Equity among classrooms, schools and districts across the state. Poverty, unequal
resources
7
Not in Favor of PBC due to philosophical/lack of research concerns
8
PBC will lead to culture and morale issues
9
PBC will lead to unethical practices
10 Concerns related to fairness-fair process, fair system, fair criteria
11 Union concerns and barriers to dismissing ineffective teachers
12 Factors or variables out of the schools control (parent support, attendance, etc)
13 Concerns related to teacher development and retention
14 Concerns about teachers becoming selective about which students they want in
their classes
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Table 10
Priority Two Themes in Order of Frequency
________________________________________________________________________
Priority Two Themes in Order of Frequency
1
Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure performance of all
teachers/equity between teachers
2
Concerns regarding the Evaluation. (time for principals to learn, consistency from
school to school, time for principals to evaluate, quality evaluation tool)
3
Collaboration v. Competition
4
Equity among classrooms and districts across the state. Poverty, unequal resources
5
Money/Costs related to PBC
6
Culture and Morale Issues
7
Not in Favor of PBC due to philosophical/lack of research concerns
8
Concerns related to fairness-fair process, fair system, fair criteria
9
Union concerns and barriers to dismissing ineffective teachers
10 Factors or variables out of the schools control (parent support, attendance, etc)
11 Concerns regarding clear PBC components and “weights”
12 Will lead to unethical practices
13 Concerns related to teacher development and retention
14 Concerns about teachers becoming selective about which students they want in
their classes
15 Lack of teacher buy-in, understanding and/or support
Table 11
Top 5 Concerns By Theme
________________________________________________________________________
Top 5 Concerns By Theme
1
Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure performance of all
teachers/equity between teachers
2
Concerns regarding the Evaluation. (time for principals to learn, consistency from
school to school, time for principals to evaluate, quality evaluation tool)
3
Not in Favor of PBC due to philosophical/lack of research concerns
4
Equity among classrooms and districts across the state. Poverty, unequal resources
5
Collaboration v. Competition
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Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to identify the attitudes of school principals in the
state of Colorado towards performance based compensation systems for both teachers
and principals. This study was designed to address whether years of experience, highest
level of education, AYP status or region of school were related to the principal’s
perceptions of performance based compensation, its implementation factors and how it
may affect education. In addition, this study contained questions obtained from similar
studies so that comparisons could be made between the attitudes of superintendents,
principals and teachers regarding performance based compensation. Most studies related
to the attitudes of individuals toward performance-based compensation are targeted
primarily to teachers. Of the studies that were directed toward administrators, the
majority of participants were superintendents or associate superintendents. There is a
lack of research regarding principal’s attitudes toward performance-based compensation.
The Race to the Top grant has provided funding to states that have demonstrated a
system for tying student achievement to teacher performance. In addition, the grant
encourages the states to compensate teachers and principals in new ways related to their
effectiveness. Performance based compensation systems have been used in various
forms throughout Colorado school districts for years. However, the stage is being set in
Colorado so that new ways of implementing performance based systems of compensation
can be considered. The Colorado Senate Bill 12-191 and the Colorado Effectiveness
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Council have now created standards of teacher and principal effectiveness that could
significantly contribute to a system that differentiates pay based on performance. The
push towards performance based compensation is just part of the public and political
belief that reform measures are needed to improve our educational system in the United
States. Mainstream media often discusses performance based compensation as a solution
to what is currently perceived as the failing educational system. Many studies have
emphasized that stakeholders must be supportive for new initiatives to be successful and
school principals have been recognized repeatedly as important contributors to the
effectiveness of schools. The school principal is the person who is directly responsible
for making sure teachers are following district and state policies as well as the Colorado
Department of Education guidelines. The school principal is the person solely
responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of the teachers in his or her school. It stands
to reason that the attitudes of school principals regarding performance based
compensation would be helpful to understand when considering the implementation of a
system that links a teacher’s effectiveness to their pay.
In order to identify the attitudes of principals toward performance-based
compensation, the researcher developed a 21-item online survey that was, before
distributed, subjected to an expert review by seven individuals with a variety of
backgrounds and experiences. The survey link was distributed by email to public school
principals in the state of Colorado as identified by the Colorado Department of Education
list of districts and schools. Individual websites were used to confirm email address. Of
the 1225 emails that were originally sent, 62 were rejected as invalid email addresses.
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The Survey Monkey website was used to house the survey and it was available to
participants from January 15, 2012 until February 15, 2012. Three reminder emails were
sent to participants at the beginning of each week during the time the survey was open.
Of the 1225 principals that were asked to participate, 38% responded. This strong
response rate was also strongly representative of the general Colorado public school
principal population. 55% of the principals in the state of Colorado are female whereas
53% of the survey respondents were female. 45% of the principals in Colorado are male
and 47% of the survey respondents were male. In addition, the school regions were also
similarly represented in this study with rural principals making up 29% (38% in
Colorado), urban comprising 22% (21% in Colorado) and suburban principals
representing 49% (41% in Colorado).
Respondents of this survey were generous with their time. Throughout the survey
the respondents were able to leave comments and were prompted by open-ended
questions. In total, respondents left forty comments discussing the various educational
levels that should be included in PBC, 48 comments discussing the factors that should be
included in PBC, forty comments regarding the obstacles that they perceived are standing
in the way of PBC and 822 comments listing their concerns about performance based
compensation. All of the comments were coded, analyzed and reported in chapter 4.
Summary of Survey Results
Overwhelmingly, principals agree that if a performance based compensation
system is implemented in their district that it should be for all levels: teachers, principals
and administrators. Although, some respondents indicated that teachers should be the
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only group included 12.7%). In addition, several respondents indicated that if principals
and teachers (without administrators) had been given as a choice, they would have
selected that option.
The principal respondents attitudes were also very clear when it came to the
factors that they believe should be included in PBC if such a system were to be
implemented. Student achievement and teacher evaluations were the two factors that
were chosen by over 30% more principals than any other factor. These results indicate
that the respondents must agree with the criteria set forth by the Race to the Top grant,
which encourages states to demonstrate a system for tying student achievement to teacher
performance. In addition to student achievement and teacher evaluations, graduation
rates and teacher attendance were identified by over 40% of the respondents. Student
attendance, teacher retention and fiscal management were selected as factors for over
30% of the respondents. Most principals agree (87.8%) that teacher grievance issues
should not be included as a factor in PBC.
Colorado principal respondents also identified the obstacles that they would
expect to experience when or if a performance based compensation system is
implemented. The number one obstacle identified by principals is their current capacity
to link teacher evaluations and student achievement to an individual teachers total
evaluation. According to Senate Bill 10-191, fifty percent of a teacher’s total evaluation
should be student achievement. The state requires the individual school districts to
develop balanced assessment systems that can be used for this purpose. School districts
across the state are currently working on these systems. However, there were no
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indications given by the principals that responded to this survey that any district or school
in the state of Colorado currently has an assessment system that can be used reliably or
effectively for this purpose. In fact, many principals left comments regarding their
concerns in this area. According to Murnane and Cohen (1986) this becomes the major
difference between systems of performance based compensation between the business
world and the world of education. Teaching is a collaborative effort where many
teachers contribute to each student’s achievement. It is difficult to pinpoint and give
credit to a single teacher that is responsible for the achievement of a single student. So,
although the principal respondents believe these two factors should be included in
performance-based compensation if such a system is implemented, they emphasize that
there is not a current or possibly effective system for making that happen.
When principals were asked to speculate about how performance based
compensation would effect education, it is clear that they are undecided. According to
the results of this study, the percentage of principals who think that PBC will result in
resentment among teachers is almost exactly the same as the percentage of principals
who are undecided (29.6% and 29.7% respectively). In addition, there were almost as
many principals that reported that they are unsure if PBC will have a positive impact on
teacher recruitment (n=137) as there were that reported that they agree that it will have a
positive impact on teacher recruitment (n=152). Finally, although a greater percentage of
principals agree that PBC will lead to both improved student achievement and better and
more effective teaching, there is still a large percentage of principals that are undecided
in these areas (31.5% and 32.6% respectively). Further research would need to be
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conducted to explore what caused such a large percentage of principals to be undecided
when it comes to how PBC will effect education.
By responding to a series of statements regarding the factors and beliefs related to
performance-based compensation, the researcher was able to determine that the principal
respondents have clear opinions regarding current practices and tools. For example, they
believe that they have been provided with the tools necessary to fairly and reasonable
evaluate teachers in their current system. They also believe that their supervisor has the
tools necessary to fairly and reasonably evaluate them. In addition, the principals in this
study agree that their teachers trust them to evaluate them fairly.
The principal respondents provided a total of 822 statements of concern. Fourteen
separate themes were identified from these statements. The top five concerns were:
1. Concerns regarding effectively using assessment to measure
performance of all teachers/equity between teachers
2. Concerns regarding evaluation (time for principals to learn,
consistency from school to school, time for principals to evaluate,
quality of evaluation tool).
3. Not in favor of PBC due to philosophical views or concerns about lack
of research.
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4. Concerns regarding the equity between classrooms and districts across
the state due to poverty levels and unequal resources.
5. Concerns that performance based compensation will result in a decline
in teacher collaboration and an increase in competition between
teachers.
These findings indicate that there is not a strong general acceptance of
performance based compensation systems by the principals who responded to this study.
Superintendents and Teachers
The purpose of this study was to determine the attitudes of principals in the state
of Colorado on the topic of performance-based compensation. Other studies have been
completed that have studied the attitudes of other educator groups such as teachers and
superintendents. Several questions in this study were duplicated from the studies of other
educator groups so that comparison data can be reported.
In 2009, the American Association of School Administrators (AASA) completed
a study about performance-based compensation. The sample for this study included
superintendents and associate superintendents. Three questions from the current study
were also used in the AASA study. When superintendents were asked which educator
groups should be included in pay for performance programs their answers were
somewhat similar to the answers from the principals in the current study. Comparison
results are reported in Table 12. The clear majority in both the superintendent and
principal groups was the category that specified all three groups of educators should be
included in pay for performance systems. With 14% compared to 3.4%, the respondents
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of the AASA study indicated to a much larger percentage that principals should be
included in a performance based compensation system.
Table 12
Which Educator Groups Should be Included in Pay for Performance Programs
________________________________________________________________________
Which Educator Groups Should be Included in Pay for Performance Programs
Educator Group
2009 AASA Response %
2012 Principal Response %
________________________________________________________________________
All 3 Levels

62%

82.4%

Teacher

15%

12.7%

Principal

14%

3.4%

Administrator

9%

1.5%

Total
100%
100%
________________________________________________________________________
Additionally, the AASA study asked superintendent and associate superintendent
respondents about the individual indicators that should be included if a pay for
performance program was developed in their districts. Both the AASA respondents and
the respondents of the current study agree that student achievement is the most important
indicator to include in such a program. Both groups’ data resulted in 89% of the
respondents choosing student achievement. Both the AASA respondents and the current
study respondents also agree that teacher evaluations are the second most important
indicator to include in a performance based program. The only difference in priorities
between the superintendent respondents and the principal respondents is in the teacher
retention indicator. A greater percentage of principal respondents reported that including
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teacher retention as an indicator in performance based programs than AASA respondents.
Complete comparison results for the individual indicators that should be included in
performance based compensation systems are reported in Table 13.
Table 13
Individual Indicators That Should be Included in Pay for Performance
________________________________________________________________________
Individual Indicators That Should be Included in Pay for Performance
Indicator
2009 AASA Response %
2012 Principal Response %
________________________________________________________________________
Student Achievement

89%

89%

Teacher Evaluations

68%

78%

Graduation Rates

54%

44%

Teacher Attendance

54%

44%

Fiscal Management

39%

36%

Student Attendance

37%

32%

Student Behavior

35%

27%

Teacher Retention

22%

37%

Teacher Grievances
6%
12%
________________________________________________________________________
Respondents from the AASA study and respondents from the current study
disagree on the most important obstacles that face the implementation of performance
based compensation systems. Comparison results are reported in Table 14. The number
one concern for the administrator respondents from the AASA study is teacher union
resistance. Although this was the second most concern for the principal respondents, a
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greater percentage of principal respondents reported that the capacity to link student
achievement to teacher evaluations would be an obstacle. More principal respondents
than AASA respondents also saw community support as an obstacle.
Table 14
Obstacles
________________________________________________________________________
Obstacles
2009 AASA Response %
2012 Principal Response %
________________________________________________________________________
Teacher Union Resistance

75%

67%

Capacity to link data to evaluations

66%

83%

Costs

50%

56%

School System Support

20%

34%

School Board Resistance

12%

12%

Lack of Community Support
9%
16%
________________________________________________________________________
In addition to comparing the attitudes of principals to superintendents, this study
can also be used to compare principals’ attitudes with teacher attitudes. The attitudes of
principals can be compared to the attitudes of teachers using the questions that were
derived from a study by Catherine Farrell and Jonathan Morris in 2004. The current
study and the study by Farrell and Morris have five questions in common and produced
very different results.
When respondents of both studies were asked to indicate their level of agreement
with the statement that stated PBC will have a positive impact on teacher recruitment,
83% of the teacher respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed whereas only 29% of the
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principal respondents disagreed. These respondent groups also disagreed with whether or
not PBC would result in better and more effective teaching and whether PBC would
result in improved student achievement. 77.2% of the teacher respondents disagreed with
the statement that PBC would result in better and more effective teaching where only
24% of the principal respondents disagreed with that statement. 73.1% of the teacher
respondents also disagreed with the statement that PBC would result in improved student
achievement compared to only 23% of the principal respondents disagreeing.
Comparing the statements where the majority of respondents agreed with
statements produced differences between the teacher and principal respondents, although
to a slight lesser degree. 92.1% of teacher respondents agree that PBC will cause
resentment among teaching staff. Only 40.7% of the principal respondents agreed with
that statement. Finally, 93% of the teacher respondents agreed that PBC will be
problematic because it is hard to link the work done in schools to individual performance
compared to 59% of the principal respondents agreeing with that statement. Complete
comparative results are reported in Table 15.
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Table 15
Comparing Teacher Attitudes to Principal Attitudes
________________________________________________________________________
Statement
Principals
Teachers
________________________________________________________________________
PBC will be problematic because it is
hard to link the work done in schools
to individual performance. Results
reported in % of agree/strongly agree.

59%

93%

PBC will cause resentment among staff.
Results reported in % of
agree/strongly agree.

40.7%

92.1%

PBC will have a positive impact on
teacher recruitment. Results reported
in % of disagree/strongly disagree.

29%

83%

PBC will result in better and more
effective teaching. Results reported
in % of disagree/strongly disagree.

24%

77.2%

PBC will result in an improvement in
student achievement. Results reported
in % of disagree/strongly disagree.
23%
73.1%
________________________________________________________________________
Table ?? Comparing teacher attitudes from a 2004 study to principal attitudes from the
current study.
Summary of Comparisons
When comparing the attitudes of the Colorado principal respondents to the
attitudes of superintendents and associate superintendents targeted in the American
Association of School Administrators study of 2009, very few differences emerge. Both
educator groups put student achievement and teacher evaluations at the top of their list of
factors that should be included in PBC systems. Although the AASA identified the
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resistance from teacher unions as the number one obstacle for its respondents, this was
still identified as the second most identified obstacle by the Colorado principals.
Capacity to link data to evaluations was the most identified obstacle by the principal
respondents.
The attitudes of the Colorado principal respondents can also be compared to the
attitudes of teachers from a variety of studies. Teachers with more experience have
shown to be less supportive of PBC in some studies. However, other than a slight
disagreement about whether or not PBC will result in teacher recruitment (more
experienced principals disagree that PBC will result in teacher recruitment whereas
principals with less experience agree), there are no significant differences among the
principal respondents based on length of experience. Teachers that are associated with a
teacher’s union are generally less supportive of performance pay as well. Although
principals are not generally associated with teacher’s unions, the majority of principal
respondents (67.1%) in this survey indicated that a teachers union is an obstacle to PBC.
Specific reasons that teachers oppose performance based compensation have also
been identified by research. It seems that teachers and principals don’t agree on whether
or not PBC will result in a lack of collaboration. Whereas this has been an identified
concern of teachers in previous studies, only 25% of the principal respondents in this
survey agree with them. Another commonly cited reason for teacher opposition to PBC
is they believe the system will not be fair. It has also been stated, however, that the
teachers were more likely to support PBC if they had a high degree of confidence in their
principal. According to the majority of the principals in this study (65.2%), felt that they
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have the tools they need to fairly and accurately evaluate teachers. The results of this
study could indicate that there is still a difference in perspective between teachers and
principals on the issue of fairness, or it might be predicted that the evaluation tools
recently developed and used by principals are increasing the trust that teachers have in
the evaluation process.
Demographic Differences
When the performance based compensation statements were compared to the
demographics: years of experience, highest level of education, AYP status and region of
school, statistically significant differences were identified. Principals in schools where
AYP was met, as compared to principals in schools where AYP was not met, more
strongly agreed that their teachers trust them to give them a fair and reasonable
evaluation. This is not surprising due to the research that suggests that relational trust in
schools is a critical element in improving student achievement (Slotnik, 2010). This
research would support that academically struggling schools must have a lack of trust as
compared to academically successful schools.
More differences appear when comparing principals in this area as well.
Principals in struggling schools tend to believe that all education levels should be
included in a system of performance based compensation. Principals in schools where
AYP targets were met were twice as likely to indicate that only teachers should be
included in PBC systems. Finally, when looking at the factors that principals suggest
should be included in a performance based compensation system, only 38% of the
principals in schools where AYP targets were met suggested that graduation rates should
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be included whereas 50% of the principals in the struggling schools indicated that they
should be included. Overall, principals in struggling schools expressed that the systems
for performance based compensation should be a result of many factors, and not just
student achievement.
When the PBC statements were compared to the demographic category of school
region, additional differences were identified. Differences in attitudes regarding the idea
that self-evaluations should be included in rating teachers and principals for performance
based compensation were apparent between all three regions: rural, urban and suburban.
However in the remaining statements where significant differences were uncovered, the
rural and suburban groups had no significant difference of means with each other, only as
compared to the urban group. The urban region disagreed more strongly than the other
two groups that PBC will lead to a lack of collaboration among staff. In addition, the
urban region agreed more strongly than the other two groups that PBC will lead to better
and more effective teaching and that it will lead to improved student achievement.
Although to a lesser degree, the urban principal respondents also agree more strongly that
PBC will have a positive impact on teacher recruitment. Ultimately, urban principals
tend to favor performance based compensation more strongly than principals in other
geographic locations.
It is clear that the factors that principals believe need to be included in a
performance based compensation system are the same things that they have concerns
about. When the principals that responded to this survey were given the opportunity to
list their concerns about PBC, they provided a total of 822 comments expressing their
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concerns. Although a complete analysis of these open ended comments is included in
chapter four, the top five concerns for principals were: 1) concerns related to the data that
would be needed to effectively and equitably complete a teacher or principal’s evaluation
for a PBC system, 2) concerns about the teacher evaluation system including a lack of
consistency and the amount of time that it takes to create a fair and reasonable evaluation,
3) overall philosophical concerns related to PBC and the lack of supportive research, 4) a
concern regarding the lack of equity between classrooms, schools and districts due to
unequal resources and poverty, and 5) a concern that collaboration will be negatively
affected by PBC. Even though there were no questions on the survey that asked the
participant to agree or disagree with the philosophy of a performance based compensation
system; the respondents did not fail to list this as their third concern. In fact, there were
70 comments that showed respondents to be against performance-based compensation
including: “great teachers motivation is not stemmed by money,” “the linkage between
performance and pay lacks a sound theoretical underpinning,” “research really does not
indicate that it improves student performance” and “creativity is not fostered in a pay for
performance system.”
Limitations
Because the researcher in this study is currently a principal, biases may exist
related to the role of the principal as it relates to teacher effectiveness and student
achievement.
This research was limited to public school principals in 178 districts across the
state of Colorado. These districts are located in rural, urban and suburban areas that vary
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greatly in socioeconomic status. Therefore, the results of this study may or may not
represent those of the greater principal population in the United States. Additionally,
principals across the state may different levels of understanding of performance based
compensation systems. Performance based compensation systems and compensation
models vary greatly from district to district.
Finally, the questions that were selected for this survey were based on previous
research that may have had a negative view towards performance based compensation.
Therefore, this survey may also be skewed negatively towards performance based
compensation. The researcher did not ask the participants how they feel about
performance based compensation, only about their concerns regarding performance based
compensation. Therefore, results can not include the respondent’s feelings about
performance based compensation.
Conclusions
All principals do not agree when it comes to performance based compensation.
This is not surprising. But what is surprising is that the principals from urban schools
tend to be more favorable than suburban or rural school principals. Considering that
concerns regarding equity among classrooms, schools and districts due to unequal
resources and poverty was listed in the top 5 concerns of all principals respondents, it is a
surprising result that the principals in urban schools tend to be more favorable toward
performance based compensation. Urban schools tend to have higher rates of poverty
and higher ethnic populations, which have historically been associated with lower student
achievement. In addition, there are reportedly a larger percentage of schools in urban
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areas that are not making AYP targets and the schools not making AYP targets reported a
lack of trust between teachers and principals. Perhaps the principals in these areas are
looking for a system that is less subjective so that trust can be increased.
It is also worth considering that the responses that came from the principals
working in urban schools were affected by the performance based compensation system
that was implemented in Denver Public Schools in 2009 called ProComp. ProComp is
described as a groundbreaking compensation system that links teacher pay to the school
district’s instructional mission and student achievement. Although other forms of
performance based compensation systems have been tried around the state, Denver Public
Schools is the only one that has linked pay to student achievement. It could also be
possible that because the ProComp system has been in practice for several years that
principals working in this system have grown to accept performance based compensation
more than in other areas. However, even if the urban principals responses were affected
by ProComp, only slightly more than 40% of urban respondents reported that PBC will
have a positive impact on teacher recruitment, will lead to better and more effective
teaching and will lead to improved student achievement.
Ever since the 1983 report titled “A Nation at Risk” the education system in the
United States has seen extreme attacks by politicians, educational organizations and
citizens alike. Education reform is a top agenda item for politicians and is frequently
reported in the mainstream media. Movies such as “Waiting for Superman” have been
created to show the problems that occur within the educational system. States are
beginning to put new laws into effect that drastically change how the education system
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has historically worked. Teacher unions are under attack as well. Several states,
including Wisconsin, Indiana and Ohio have passed laws that limit the collective
bargaining rights of teacher unions. All of this negativity has decreased teacher morale,
has put teachers and unions on the defensive and has reduced trust in the system. When
Michelle Rhee, former chancellor of D.C. public schools, attempted to significantly
change the teacher salary structure, she indicated that the purpose for the performance
based compensation system that she was trying to implement was to reward the teachers
who get results, while encouraging others to leave the profession. In the past, systems of
performance based compensation were implemented as a way of motivating teachers to
improve their practice and increase student achievement. However, the research on
whether or not PBC increases teacher motivation is mixed. The current political climate
has seemed to dismiss PBC as a motivation booster and more often has the attitude that if
PBC can induce highly effective teachers to stay and ineffective to leave, student
achievement would improve. Again, the principal respondents in this survey that are not
meeting AYP targets report that their teachers are less likely to trust them. With all that
is going on at the national and local level in regards to education reform, this data is not
surprising.
Regardless of the driving theory, performance based compensation is being
strongly suggested. However, unless many changes are made with the teacher evaluation
system and the data systems that can be used to effectively link student achievement to an
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individual teacher’s performance, the schools in Colorado are clearly not ready to
implement a performance based compensation system that significantly alters or replaces
traditional compensation systems.
Recommendations
Although some principals appear to be more willing to accept performance based
compensation systems in certain cases, general acceptance is not overwhelming. If
education policies in the state of Colorado continue to emphasize teacher and principal
effectiveness as determined by student achievement, everyone must work together to
solve the biggest problems that are standing in the way. Clearly, solutions must be found
that are equitable among the wide variety of teacher and principal groups that exist.
When comparing the results of this study to previous studies focused on teacher
attitudes (Farrell & Morris, 2004; Heyburn et al., 2010; Sautte, 1987), there is a clear
difference between the perceptions of teachers versus those of principals when it comes
to performance based compensation systems. It is recommended that teachers be
involved in creating new systems for linking student achievement to evaluation. The
teachers need to trust that the system will be fair and equitable to all. This system must
include a way to link student achievement to all teachers including those teachers that do
not teach in the typically tested grades or subjects.
In addition, mainstream media from Colorado and around the nation are
negatively portraying teacher unions and this study also identified teacher unions as being
a concern to the principal respondents. The animosity that exists between teacher unions,
district leaders, school boards and policy makers is keeping the focus on identifying what
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is wrong instead of working on possible solutions. It is recommended that members of
teacher unions join together with non-member teachers when working on new data and
assessment systems.
Finally, further research is needed to explore the effects that current and newly
designed performance based compensation systems are having around the state. Many
districts are either currently designing or thinking about designing new systems of
compensation. These plans and the results need to be shared with and among districts to
increase the effectiveness of performance based compensation for the sake of all
Colorado students. Districts believe in collaboration for their teachers and students, now
is the time for districts to also collaborate with each other.
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Appendix A Informed Consent Statement
Informed Consent for “Survey on Principals’ Attitudes toward Performance Based
Compensation”
A. Introduction. You are being invited to participate in a study designed to investigate
Colorado public school principals’ attitudes toward performance based compensation
systems. The research project is not intended to judge the effectiveness of any given
method of paying teachers or principals, but, rather to assess principals’ acceptance of
different pay systems. Please read this form and ask any questions prior to completing
the online survey. Completion of the survey indicates that you are agreeing to participate
in the study.
B. Participant Involvement. Your involvement in the study will be limited to
answering the questions on this survey. The researcher does not anticipate any other
requirements on your behalf. The survey will take less than ___minutes to complete.
(The amount of time needed for the survey will be determined during field testing.)
C. Conflict of Interest. The researcher, Carolyn Stephenson, will use data gathered
from your responses and those of others as the basis for a dissertation as part of her
course of study toward a Doctorate in Educational Administration and Policy Studies at
the University of Denver. Carolyn Stephenson is a principal in the state of Colorado,
however, confidentiality of responses will eliminate any concern for a conflict of interest
within the school district she is employed.
D. Risks. The researcher does not anticipate any risks as a result of participating in the
study.
E. Benefits. The information gathered will help assess the degree to which various
groups of principals favor or disfavor certain forms of compensation. The information
gathered may help legislators, local school boards and school districts design and/or
revise performance based compensation systems.
F. Confidentiality. The researcher is not asking that you include your name on the
survey. While there are certain demographic questions asked on the survey instrument,
these questions are intended only to identify the extent to which individuals in various
subgroups compare to others. Neither the researcher nor anyone else associated with the
study will attempt to identify individuals through responses to the demographic
questions. No information will be included in any published report that will make it
possible to identify a particular subject. Your survey will be kept confidential and will
not be identifiable in any way. Research records will be for the researcher’s eyes only.
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G. Contact Information. The project director, Carolyn Stephenson, and her advisor, Dr.
Kent Seidel, PhD., may be contacted directly if you have any questions or concerns
regarding this study. Carolyn Stephenson may be contacted by email at
carrie.stephenson@dcsdk12.org. Dr. Kent Seidel may be contacted by email at
kent.seidel@du.edu.
H. Participation. Your participation in this study is purely voluntary. Participation will
be limited to the amount of time necessary to complete the survey. By completing the
online survey you are agreeing to have your opinions included in a statistical analysis of
the attitudes of principals towards performance based compensation systems.
I. Results. Composite results of this study will be available to you upon request.
By completing this survey, you are agreeing to participate in the research realizing that
participation is strictly voluntary and that you may withdraw at any time.
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Appendix B Survey Instrument
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